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PROTECTING FROM ENDLESS HARM: A ROADMAP FOR 
COERCION CHALLENGES AFTER N.F.I.B. V. SEBELIUS
ERIC TURNER*
INTRODUCTION
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius1 (NFIB) was 
one of the most anticipated Supreme Court decisions of all time, with most 
attention focused on whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s (“PPACA”) “individual mandate” to buy healthcare coverage was 
constitutional. The individual mandate promised to be a re-examination of 
the Court’s precedent on Congress’ commerce clause power, federalism, 
and individual sovereignty. It came as a shock, therefore, when a plurality 
of the Supreme Court instead declared the act’s Medicaid expansion un-
constitutional for being “coercive.”2 Two separate opinions—one written 
by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, the oth-
er a “Joint Dissent” joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito—declared that Congress had “coerced” the States by threatening to 
withhold all or part of a State’s existing Medicaid funding if that State 
failed to implement the Medicaid expansion.3 Though the coercion argu-
ment has existed for decades,4 NFIB marks the first time the Court has 
declared a congressional spending power program coercive.5
Both Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissent refused to explicitly 
state when the Medicaid expansion became coercive.6 Chief Justice Rob-
erts did not elaborate on where the line between “persuasion” and coercion 
is crossed, simply stating that the Medicaid expansion crossed that line.7
As a result of this vague language, a number of academic articles have been 
*Chicago-Kent College of Law, Class of 2014. A tremendous amount of thanks is owed to Professor 
Carolyn Shapiro, whose guidance and support made this note possible, and to my parents Joe and 
Roxanne, for all their support throughout law school.
1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. U.S. 2566 (2012).
2. Id. at 2604.
3. See id. at 2606-07.
4. See Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
5. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
6. See NFIB, 132 S. U.S. at 2607; id. at 2662 (joint dissent).
7. Id. at 2606-07 (Roberts, C.J., majority for Medicaid Expansion).
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written focused solely around trying to determine just why the Medicaid 
expansion was coercive, and how states might use coercion to challenge 
other conditional spending programs.8
The need for a clear, workable coercion definition is critical to ensure 
that Congress can enact constitutional legislation, states are not forced into 
enacting programs against their will, and courts do not strike down non-
coercive programs. Commentators have claimed that the door is open to 
attack for a wide variety of congressional spending power programs.9
These programs ultimately affect every American, providing for healthcare, 
the environment, education, civil rights, and having dramatic impacts on
state budgets and regulations. Indeed, the coercion doctrine has already 
been used to challenge federal spending power programs. For example, 
Texas, along with several other states, challenged the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency’s (EPA) authority under the Clean Air Act to require States 
to amend their State Implementation Plans (SIP).10 The EPA has the au-
thority to sanction a state that fails to amend its SIP by reducing federal 
highway funding or construction bans.11 After NFIB, Texas wasted little 
time submitting a notice of supplemental authority, arguing that the EPA’s 
action is coercive: Congress gave Texas the “choice” of adopting the feder-
al regulations, or facing severe sanctions.12 The D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected this argument, because the Clean Air Act’s sanctions were 
“not comparable” to the Medicaid expansion’s threat to take away signifi-
cant state funding.13
8. See, e.g. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After 
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 873-892 (2013) (suggesting coercion occurs when Congress threatens to withhold 
funds from a separate, independent program if a state does not implement a new program); see also
David Orentlicher, NFIB v. Sibelius: Proportionality in the Exercise of Congressional Power, (Robert 
H. McKinney Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-32), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178124 (suggesting coercion lies when the states loss, or the Government’s
action, is unduly disproportionate); James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s
Mandated Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, 2011-2012 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 67 (viewing coercion through the lens contract law, and protecting against undue lever-
age when conditional spending ‘contracts’ are modified such as in NFIB).
9. Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 864.
10. Lawrence Hurley, Texas Wastes No Time in Citing Supreme Court Health Care Ruling in 
Clean Air Act Litigation, E & E PUBLISHING, LLC (August 1, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/
Greenwire/2012/08/01/1.
11. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, ENV’T AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIV., 97-959 ENR,
HIGHWAY FUND SANCTIONS FOR CLEAN AIR ACT VIOLATIONS 2 (Oct. 22, 1997), available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/490.pdf.
12. See Richard Lazarus, Texas Unconvincing In Clean Air Suit, 29 THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 
12 (Sept./Oct. 2012), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rlazarus/docs/columns/
LAZARUS_FORUM_2012_SEP-OCT.pdf.
13. Texas v. EPA, No. 10-1425, 2013 WL 3836226, at *15 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2013).
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Is coercion an argument that simply compares the impact of a chal-
lenged program against the impact of a state losing its entire Medicaid 
funding? If so, coercion is destined to go back into a dormant state, as no 
other conditional spending program even comes close to the financial im-
pact of Medicaid.14 This note works from a premise that Chief Justice Rob-
erts and the Joint Dissenters did not intend the coercion argument to be sui 
generis to the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion.
This note seeks to propose a test to use in future coercion cases that 
does not focus solely on a piece of legislation’s economic impact. This test 
seeks to promote an accurate reading of NFIB’s coercion opinions, but does 
so by focusing on the policies underlying these opinions. By getting to the 
root of these policies, it is possible to present a coercion analysis that is less 
confusing than the face of NFIB and reduces the potential for arbitrary 
lawsuits and decision-making in future coercion cases.
Part I will examine the coercion argument’s history. Part II will briefly 
explain how the existing Medicaid program operates and how the PPACA 
Medicaid expansion will operate, and then explains the States’ challenge to 
the expansion. Part III will then outline the coercion opinions in NFIB. Part 
IV will ask and answer some of the outstanding questions NFIB poses, 
establish the policies underlying the opinions, and propose a new test—the 
“Harm” analysis—that consolidates the opinions’ policies for future use. 
Finally, Part V applies this test to a hypothetical Clean Air Act challenge to 
examine how coercion cases should play out in a post-NFIB world.
I. COERCION’S QUIET HISTORY
The Supreme Court first encountered a coercion argument in 1937 in 
Steward Mach. Co. v Davis.15 The petitioner challenged Title III of the 
Social Security Act, which appropriated tax incentives and funds to states 
for unemployment compensation programs if they implemented a tax on 
employers.16 The petitioner argued that the Act coerced states by driving 
state legislators “under the whip” of the federal government to enact laws 
that the federal government wanted them to enact.17
Justice Cardozo strongly denounced this novel argument for failing to 
draw a line where a state stopped making a voluntary decision and started 
being coerced. “The difficulty with the petitioner’s contention is that it 
confuses motive with coercion . . . . [T]o hold that motive or temptation is 
14. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. U.S. 2566, 2663 (2012).
15. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
16. See id. at 577-78.
17. Id. at 588.
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equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.”18 Justice 
Cardozo did, however, acknowledge there was some point where “pressure 
turns into compulsion,” but that this would be a “question of degree, at 
times, perhaps, of fact.”19 Unfortunately, Justice Cardozo did not elaborate.
The coercion argument doctrine essentially lay dormant at the Su-
preme Court level until South Dakota v. Dole in 1987.20 South Dakota 
challenged as unconstitutional a federal statute directing the United States 
Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of a State’s federal 
highway funds if that State’s legal drinking age was less than twenty-one.21
While Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged Congress’ broad author-
ity under the spending power to attach conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds, he outlined four requirements that must be met for such conditions 
to be constitutional.22 First, Congress’ exercise of the spending power must 
be in pursuit of the general welfare; courts should defer substantially Con-
gress on this point.23 Second, if Congress attaches conditions on federal 
funds, it must do so unambiguously so that states can exercise their choice 
to accept or reject the funds knowingly.24 Third, conditions on federal 
grants must be related to the federal interest in national projects or pro-
grams.25 Finally, Congress cannot impose unconstitutional conditions on 
grants.26 These conditions have become known as the “Dole” test.
The highway spending conditions were lawful when applied to this 
test: First the general welfare requirement was met when Congress deter-
mined the differing drinking ages amongst the states created incentives for 
people to drink and drive to and from South Dakota.27 Second, the condi-
tions were clearly stated.28 Third, the conditions on the grant were related 
to safe interstate highways, which is a national interest.29 Fourth, it was not 
unconstitutional to take away funding for the highway program: the federal 
government was not forcing South Dakota to implement a drinking age; the 
state was free to keep its drinking laws unchanged.30
18. Id. at 589-90.
19. Id. at 590.
20. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
21. Id. at 205-06.
22. See id. at 207.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 207-08.
26. See id. at 208.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 208-09.
30. See id. at 209-10.
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Even though the highway conditions had passed this test, did it none-
theless coerce South Dakota into changing its drinking laws? After all, it 
gave the state the “choice” of changing its laws or losing funding. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Justice Cardozo left the door open for 
coercion in Steward Mach. Co. by stating that “[i]n some circumstances the 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass 
the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”31 Thus, he looked to 
the relatively small amount of funding at stake—five percent of South Da-
kota’s federal highway funding—and held this was “mild encouragement” 
that left the choice to participate in the highway program up to South Dako-
ta “not merely in theory but in fact.”32 “Encouraging” a state to change its 
policies by revoking five percent of a state’s funding was permissible under 
Congress’ Spending Power.33
Even after the coercion argument got a new look in Dole, it was never 
used to successfully attack a federal conditional spending statute until 
NFIB.34 Coercion was effectively a dead argument. Prior to NFIB, a few 
federal circuits went so far as to hold that the coercion doctrine did not 
exist.35 Given that the Supreme Court nearly rejected coercion in Steward
and refused to apply it in a presumptively appropriate situation in Dole, the 
argument had little legal backing.36
Nonetheless, the coercion argument did see some success outside of 
conditional spending grants. New York v United States saw the Court strike 
down a federal regulatory statute as coercive.37 The recently enacted Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act had dictated that each State be respon-
sible for disposing of radioactive waste generated within its borders.38 The 
provision at issue required noncompliant states to take title to the radioac-
tive waste and be liable for all damages incurred by the waste generated 
prior to taking title.39 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held that this provision 
“crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.”40 States 
were given two coercive choices if they did not implement the federal pro-
31. Id. at 211.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 211-12.
34. See Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 3.
35. See Fla. ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1265 
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 
132 U.S. 2566 (2012).
36. See id. at 1265-66 (discussing how the coercion argument was viewed prior to NFIB).
37. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
38. Id. at 150-51.
39. Id. at 151.
40. Id. at 175.
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gram: either take ownership of radioactive waste, or be liable for it.41 This 
effectively “commandeered” the states into enacting a federal regulatory 
scheme, which was unconstitutionally coercive.42
Though New York did not involve a federal spending statute like Dole
or Steward Machine Co., Justice O’Connor’s opinion would later prove 
important in NFIB. Justice O’Connor held that the coercion argument’s 
main goal is to promote political “accountability.”43 When Congress leaves 
the States the option to enact or reject a program, then citizens of the States
can reward or punish their legislators at the ballot box for choosing to im-
plement a program.44 On the other hand, if the States are coerced into en-
acting a program by the federal government, “it may be state officials who 
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who 
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from . . . their deci-
sion.”45
Despite N.Y.’s holding, coercion remained an effectively dormant ar-
gument in attacking conditional spending programs until N.F.I.B.
II. MEDICAID EXPANSION AND STATE RESISTANCE
A. The PPACA Medicaid Expansion
To understand what was at stake in NFIB, the history, size, and struc-
ture of Medicaid must be explained. Medicaid is a voluntary, federal-state 
cooperative program.46 The federal government pays anywhere from half 
to seventy-five percent of a state’s overall Medicaid budget, with the feder-
al government paying more to states with lower per capita wealth.47 Medi-
caid spending, between both state and federal contributions, accounts for 
twenty percent of an average state’s overall budget.48 State Medicaid pro-
grams must cover certain population groups and provide certain benefits, 
but States retain a great amount of flexibility in structuring their programs 
to cover additional populations, provide additional services, or set differen-
tial reimbursement rates.49 The Health and Human Services Secretary has 
41. Id. at 176.
42. See id. at 176-77.
43. See id. at 168.
44. See id.
45. Id at 168-69.
46. John D. Blum & Gayland O. Hethcoat II, Medicaid Governance in the Wake of National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Finding Federalism’s Middle Pathway, from Adminis-
trative Law to State Compacts, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 601, 610 (2012).
47. See Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 18.
48. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2604 (2012).
49. See Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 17-20.
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always had the statutory authority to revoke part or all of a states’ federal 
Medicaid funding if it fails to meet the minimum federal guidelines, though 
the Secretary has never fully revoked a state’s funding.50
Medicaid covered more than fifty five million Americans prior to the 
PPACA expansion at an annual combined federal-state cost of $400 billion 
and it is the nation’s largest public health insurer.51 Today, every State 
participates in Medicaid.52 When Medicaid was enacted in 1965, it only 
required participating states to cover public aid recipients known then as 
the “deserving poor”: the elderly, disabled, children, and their caretakers 
who were currently on welfare.53 The Medicaid statute explicitly reserved 
the right for Congress to make changes to the program, however, and the 
Medicaid program is far more expansive today.54 For example, in 1988, 
Congress expanded the minimum coverage to include pregnant women, 
children up to age five below 133% of the federal poverty level, and chil-
dren up to age eighteen up to 100% of the federal poverty level.55 In 2003 
Medicaid saw its most substantial pre-PPACA expansion when Congress 
required dual Medicare-Medicaid enrollees to participate in Medicare Part 
D.56
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act included the largest 
expansion of the Medicaid coverage population in the program’s history.57
Beginning in 2013, the Act will require state Medicaid programs to cover 
all individuals under the age of 65 up to 133% of the federal poverty lev-
el58, beginning in 2014.59 The federal government would initially pay for 
100% of the additional costs incurred by this expansion (other than admin-
istrative costs) with the federal contribution rate gradually lowering to 90% 
by 2020.60 States could also offer any new enrollees cheaper, less compre-
50. See id. at 17.
51. Blum, supra note 45, at 610-11.
52. See Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 15.
53. Id. at 16.
54. See id. at 20-25.
55. See id. at 23. Undocumented Immigrants are not eligible for Medicaid, and there are substan-
tial restrictions on qualified immigrants. See Summary of Immigrant Eligibility Restrictions Under 
Current Law, HHS.GOV, www.aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/immigration/restrictions-sum.shtml#secd.
56. See Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 23-24.
57. See Blum, supra note 45, at 611-12.
58. There is a “special deduction” for Medicaid enrollees within 5% of the federal poverty level, 
so effectively states were to be required to cover their populations up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level. Id. at 612.
59. Id.
60. See Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 27-28.
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hensive “essential benefits” services than “traditional” Medicaid popula-
tions currently receive.61
The Medicaid expansion will have a significant impact on the states, 
even with the federal government’s generous match, the Congressional 
Budget Office projects that 25.6 million additional people will enroll in 
Medicaid in the next decade, increasing state administrative costs by $12 
billion and state Medicaid costs by $118 billion.62 Spurred on at least os-
tensibly63 by these costs, several states sought to challenge the Medicaid 
expansion in court.
B. The Coercion Challenge
Twenty-six state Attorney Generals ultimately joined a lawsuit that in-
cluded a coercion challenge to PPACA’s Medicaid expansion.64 The suit 
argued that the Medicaid expansion was coercive because the Health and 
Human Services Secretary had the authority to withhold all existing Medi-
caid funding unless the states’ Medicaid programs were expanded to in-
clude the new coverage population.65 Furthermore, that states faced the 
practical reality of being forced to implement the expansion; the alternative 
was losing a massive amount of federal funding composing a large amount 
of their budget, and being forced to fully fund their indigent healthcare 
population on their own.66 States could not take on the costs of covering 
their most needy citizens without Medicaid, and even if a state stopped 
participating in Medicaid, the federal government would still use tax dol-
lars from that state to fund Medicaid programs in participating states.67
At both the District and Appellate Court stages, the coercion argument 
was unsuccessful. District Court Judge Roger Vinson rejected the argument 
61. Id. at 26-27.
62. See Blum, supra note 46, at 613.
63. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that opposition to the PPACA’s enactment, and 
subsequent legal challenges, were highly partisan in nature. This note focuses only on the legal aspects 
of the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion, however, and will not analyze political arguments. See Kevin 
Sack and Eric Lichtblau, For Attorneys General, Long Shot Brings Payoffs, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, 
at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/us/politics/for-attorneys-general-health-law-
long-shot-brings-payoffs.html?pagewanted=all.
64. See Fla. ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 U.S. 2566 
(2012).
65. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16-26, Florida. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
132 U.S. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2011 WL 4500702.
66. See id. at 21-26.
67. See id.
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based on the total lack of case law supporting the coercion argument.68 On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the coercion argument not because 
coercion had little case law, but by finding that the PPACA’s Medicaid 
expansion was not coercive.69 Four factors went into this decision. First, 
the States were warned from the beginning that Congress reserved the right 
to change the Medicaid program.70 Second, the federal government bore 
nearly all the costs associated with the expansion, leaving the States’ finan-
cial coercion argument more “rhetoric than fact.”71 Third, the States had 
four years from the date the bill was enacted to decide implement the pro-
gram and adjust accordingly, or develop a replacement program.72 Fourth, 
even though the Health and Human Services Secretary had the authority to 
revoke all or part of a state’s Medicaid funding for non-compliance; the 
Secretary was not necessarily going to exercise this authority.73 Undaunted, 
the states petitioned the Supreme Court to review the coercion challenge.74
III. N.F.I.B. V. SEBELIUS
Many observers were surprised that the Supreme Court even granted 
certiorari on the Medicaid coercion challenge.75 This surprise turned to 
shock when the Court actually applied the long dormant doctrine. This 
shock gave way to confusion as observers struggled to identify just why the 
Medicaid expansion was coercive as compared to other conditional spend-
ing programs. A careful reading of the three opinions in NFIB—Chief Jus-
tice Robert’s majority, the Joint Dissent,76 and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent—
is therefore the necessary starting point in the coercion analysis.
68. Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1269 
(N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Fla. ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 U.S. 2566 (2012).
69. Fla. ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1268 
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 U.S. 
2566 (2012).
70. Id. at 1267.
71. Id.
72. Id at 1268.
73. Id.
74. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 65.
75. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal 
Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 579 (2013).
76. Referring to the unsigned opinion as the “Joint Dissent” is a bit of a misnomer. Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion, upholding the PPACA’s individual mandate was a tax and striking down the Medicaid 
expansion, was joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, joined by Justice 
Sotomayor, joined the Chief Justice in upholding the individual mandate, but dissented in striking down 
the Medicaid expansion. The “Joint Dissent” dissented from the decision upholding the individual 
mandate, but joined the Chief Justice in striking down the Medicaid expansion. As the unsigned opinion 
has become popularly referred to as the “Joint Dissent,” however, this note too shall refer to it as such.
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A. Chief Justice Roberts: The Contractual Relationship
Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis by noting that Congress does 
have authority under the Spending Power to place conditions on grants to 
the states to pressure the states to take actions, such as expanding their 
Medicaid program, which Congress could not directly order them to take.77
However, the federal government cannot simply require states to govern 
according to federal principles. In a nod to New York v. U.S., the Chief 
Justice noted that only where states have a real choice to participate in a 
program can voters know who to reward or punish for the state participat-
ing in the program; otherwise “it may be state officials who will bear the 
brunt of public disapproval [of federal decisions], while the federal officials 
who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the elec-
toral ramifications of their decision.”78 Chief Justice Roberts noted that, in 
the “typical case,” if a state does not want to implement the program, the 
state can and should defend their own sovereignty by simply “not yielding” 
to the federal offer: “The States are separate and independent sovereigns. 
Sometimes they have to act like it.”79
However, Chief Justice Roberts found that this was not a typical 
case.80 He considered the Medicaid expansion to be a threat to take away 
massive amounts of existing Medicaid funding from states that did not 
comply with the expansion.81 This threat amounted to a “gun to the head” 
that left states “with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expan-
sion.”82 Chief Justice Roberts contrasted the Medicaid expansion with the 
highway funding in Dole; a state losing five percent of its federal highway 
funding is small enough to simply be “encouragement” that ultimately left 
the final decision up to the state,83 but the Medicaid expansion was more 
than encouragement. A noncompliant state was faced with the prospect of 
losing over ten percent of its overall budget in addition to having to replace 
the large regulatory schemes built up around the Medicaid system.84 The 
financial and regulatory impact of losing all Medicaid funding would be so 
dramatic that no state could realistically turn down the Medicaid expan-
sion.85
77. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2601-02 (2012).
78. Id. at 2602-03.
79. Id. at 2603.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 2604-05.
82. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2604-05 (2012).
83. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)).
84. Id. at 2604.
85. Id.
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Finally, in the key part of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts found that 
the Medicaid expansion was sufficiently different from “traditional” Medi-
caid to effectively constitute an entirely new, separate program. Thus Con-
gress was threatening to take funds away from “traditional” Medicaid to 
force states to implement a new, separate healthcare program.86 The Medi-
caid expansion “transformed” the program from one that covered only cer-
tain populations87 into a “comprehensive national plan to provide universal 
health insurance coverage” to meet the “health care needs of the entire 
nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of the poverty lev-
el.”88 Second, Congress created a separate funding provision for the newly 
covered population; the federal government would cover the cost of new 
enrollees for at least six years, and ninety percent of their cost thereafter.89
The new population can also receive a less-comprehensive benefits pack-
age than the traditional Medicaid population.90
Chief Justice Roberts found that these changes meant Congress “rec-
ognized it was enlisting the States in a new healthcare program.”91 Chief 
Justice Roberts, remember, emphasized that conditional spending grants 
are analyzed as if they were contracts.92 The legitimacy of Congress’ 
Spending Power “rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly 
accepts the terms of the contract,” this ensures the “status of the States as 
independent sovereigns in our federal system.” 93 Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that while the Medicaid statute has always given Congress 
the right to amend any provision of it a state, at the time it agreed to the 
Medicaid “contract,” “could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reservation 
of the right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program included the power 
to transform it so dramatically.”94
Despite finding that coercion existed in this case, Chief Justice Rob-
erts ended his opinion by refusing to state just where coercion would apply 
in future cases. As “[t]he Court in Steward Machine did not ‘attempt to ‘fix 
the outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to coercion,’ . . . It is 
enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely be-
yond it.”95
86. See id. at 2605-06.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 2606.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2602.
93. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
94. Id. at 2606.
95. Id.
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B. The Joint Dissent: Restricting Federal Power
The Joint Dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito (hereafter the “Joint Dissenters”), also found the Medicaid expansion 
coercive. The Joint Dissenters’ differed from Chief Justice Roberts’ opin-
ion however, in that they did not frame the Medicaid expansion as an en-
tirely new program, nor did they focus on the States’ ability to foresee the 
change. The Joint Dissenters instead turned their attention to the coercive 
manner in which Congress structured the Medicaid expansion.
The Joint Dissenters viewed the coercion argument as a way for states 
to defend their sovereignty.96 Because the federal government has far more 
bargaining power than states do, the federal government could exercise its 
economic might to force states to enact new laws.97 The Joint Dissenters 
used the following example: If the federal government imposed a new, 
heavy nationwide tax, in order to fund a conditional spending grant pro-
gram designed to take over secondary education, states could not realisti-
cally refuse to accept the program; the state is going to see a dramatic tax 
increase regardless if it implements the program or not, and if it refuses to 
implement the program, their citizens would receive no benefits from this 
tax increase.98 Just because states would be free as a matter of law to turn 
down the funding does not mean that they realistically could do so.
In line with this hypothetical, the Joint Dissenters determined that the 
possibility of a state losing all its Medicaid funding was a dire prospect. 
The Joint Dissenters, like Chief Justice Roberts, again explained that the 
Medicaid expansion went well beyond Dole, where the loss was less than 
one percent of South Dakota’s budget.99 The Joint Dissenters noted that the 
Medicaid program’s sheer size and the practical inability of a State to ade-
quately replace it made the expansion “unlike anything we have seen in a 
prior spending-power case.”100
But the Joint Dissenters placed their greatest emphasis on the Medi-
caid expansion’s inherently coercive design. The Joint Dissenters wrote 
that the Medicaid expansion’s stated goal is “near-universal health care 
coverage.”101 Pursuant to this goal, Congress “transform[ed] [Medicaid] 
from a program covering only members of a limited list of vulnerable 
96. See id. at 2659 (joint dissent).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 2661-62.
99. Id. at 2664.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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groups into a” universal healthcare program.102 Achieving universal 
healthcare coverage could only happen if every state chose to participate in 
the Medicaid expansion. If any state chose not to participate, “there would 
be a gaping hole in the ACA’s coverage.”103 The Joint Dissenters use this 
logic to conclude that, “if Congress had thought that States might actually 
refuse to go along with the expansion of Medicaid, Congress would surely 
have devised a backup scheme,” something which the Medicaid expansion 
does not include.104 In contrast, the other major reform of the PPACA—the 
“Health Benefit Exchanges”—allowed the federal government to imple-
ment and run an exchange in the state if the state chose not to implement 
the program.105 “These features of the [Medicaid expansion] convey an 
unmistakable message: Congress never dreamed that any State would re-
fuse to go along with the expansion of Medicaid. Congress well understood 
that refusal was not a practical option.”106
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion: The Dole Approach
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, strongly re-
jected the idea that the Medicaid expansion is coercive. Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion was reactive to the arguments in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion and 
the Joint Dissent. The opinion argued against coercion as a matter of poli-
cy. As a result, for this note, it is helpful mostly in framing some of the 
concerns that the coercion doctrine brings to constitutional law.
Justice Ginsburg found that the Medicaid expansion met the Dole
conditional spending test, and thus the coercion argument should not have 
even been entertained.107 In Dole, the federal government was attempting 
to pressure states into imposing a federally-approved drinking age, which 
the federal government arguably does not have the power to impose on its 
own, and the drinking age was arguably unrelated to the goals of the na-
tional highway program.108 These issues are the reason, Justice Ginsburg 
argues, that the Dole Court was even willing to analyze the coercion argu-
ment in the first place.109 The Medicaid expansion, in contrast, “relates 
solely to the federally funded program; if States choose not to comply,
Congress has not threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other 
102. Id. at 2664-65.
103. See id. at 2665.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108. See id.
109. See id.
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program. Nor does the ACA use Medicaid funding to induce States to take 
action Congress itself could not undertake.”110 Since this expansion would 
survive under Dole, Justice Ginsburg found that Chief Justice Roberts nev-
er should have considered the coercion analysis.111
Justice Ginsburg attacked Chief Justice Roberts’ finding that the Med-
icaid expansion took states by surprise by transforming the program in a 
way the states could not have predicted in 1965.112 The Medicaid Act ex-
pressly gave Congress the right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision, 
giving states clear notice of a change of this scope.113 The Medicaid expan-
sion, which does not take effect until 2014, clearly told states they must 
extend eligibility to adults with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty 
level.114 The “contractual” terms of a conditional spending program should 
be viewed from the time states are to receive new funding, not when the 
states sign up for the program to receive funds in the first place.115
Finally, Justice Ginsburg ended by echoing Justice Cardozo’s con-
cerns in Steward Machine: “When future Spending Clause challenges ar-
rive, as they likely will in the wake of today’s decision, how will litigants 
and judges assess whether ‘a State has a legitimate choice whether to ac-
cept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds?’”116 In failing to 
set a line where financial inducement gives way to coercion, the Court has 
left litigants and judges with no guidance on how to determine if a State 
has a legitimate choice whether to accept the federal conditions in ex-
change for funds. “Are courts to measure the number of dollars the Federal 
Government might withhold for noncompliance? The portion of the State’s 
budget at stake? And which State’s—or States’—budget is determina-
tive[?]”117
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2634-35.
112. See id. at 2635-39.
113. Id. at 2636-38.
114. See id. at 2637.
115. See id. at 2638.
116. Id. at 2640.
117. Id at 2640-41. Justice Ginsburg ended her opinion by stating that the coercion doctrine is 
based in a flawed premise: that states are entitled to funds attached to voluntary conditional spending 
programs. See id. at 2641. This is arguably the strongest criticism of the “coercion” argument, as it 
effectively transforms expensive, voluntary conditional spending programs like Medicaid into an enti-
tlement for states. As the purpose of this note is not to debate the merits of the coercion argument, 
however, Justice Ginsburg’s criticism will not be explored further.
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IV. THE HARM ANALYSIS
An ideal framework for identifying unconstitutional coercion encom-
passes as much of the policies in NFIB, as possible, while reducing the 
potential for differential treatment or arbitrary decision-making. To build 
this framework, I will first identify and answer the major questions left 
unanswered by NFIB, and then outline the major policies of the NFIB opin-
ions. These analyses lay the groundwork for the framework I will then 
propose, which I call the “Harm” analysis.
A. Outstanding Questions After NFIB
Three outstanding questions are pivotal in developing a framework for 
future coercion cases: First, what is the status of the Dole conditional 
spending test after NFIB? Second, does the economic impact of the chal-
lenged program determine if the program is coercive? Third, what is the 
significance of Chief Justice Roberts’ “separate program” analysis?
1. Does Dole have a role after NFIB?
Though “Dole has long been the definitive test for determining wheth-
er conditions placed on federal spending are constitutional,”118 the test has 
been criticized as toothless, conceptually inconsistent with other federalism 
doctrines, and too deferential to Congress.119 At the District Court level, 
Judge Roger Vinson even suggested that the Supreme Court reconsider its 
Spending Power precedent in light of Dole’s inadequacy.120 The States’ 
petition for cert did not even raise the issue of the Dole test,121 and only 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion explicitly analyzed Dole as it relates to the 
Medicaid expansion.122
Chief Justice Roberts did not ignore Dole, however. The Dole court, 
the Chief Justice found, conducted its coercion analysis after it found that 
the drinking age condition on the highway funding was not a restriction on 
how funds were to be used, and was therefore a tool for Congress to enact 
118. Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 50.
119. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off The Dole: Why The Court 
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, And How A Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So,
78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003).
120. Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1269 
(N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Fla. ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 U.S. 2566 (2012).
121. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fla. ex. rel. Attorney Gen, supra note 65.
122. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2634-35 (2012).
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policy changes in the state.123 In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts similarly 
determined that the condition attached to the Medicaid expansion—
revoking all of a state’s Medicaid funding if it did not implement the ex-
pansion—was used to pressure the states into enacting policy changes, not 
to govern the use of Medicaid funds.124 Chief Justice Roberts then began 
his analysis of whether this pressure passes the point to where it turns into 
compulsion.125 Had Chief Justice Roberts determined that the conditions 
attached to the Medicaid expansion acted only to govern the use of Medi-
caid funding, the Dole test suggests he could have avoided the coercion 
argument completely. Because the Chief Justice arguably considered Dole
in reaching his opinion, this suggests that the Dole analysis has not been
rendered moot by NFIB.
Dole should also continue to play a role in coercion cases for con-
sistency and precedential purposes. Dole, at its heart, is largely a restate-
ment of federalism-based limits that the Supreme Court has placed on con-
conditional spending grants throughout history. Dole protects both state 
sovereignty and Congress’ broad spending power by requiring that spend-
ing be in the general welfare, that states be given clear notice to the condi-
tions, that the conditions be related to a national interest, and that the 
conditions be constitutional. Dole also gives clear standards for Congress, 
states, and courts to follow in making at least an initial determination of 
whether such grants are legal. And while Dole is extremely deferential to 
Congress, this is not necessarily a fault of the test—courts have always 
been highly deferential to Congress’ spending power.126
2. Does the economic impact of the program determine coercion?
Both Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters go into detail 
about the Medicaid expansion’s size, and the substantial burden states 
would face if federal funding were revoked. This attention to the Medicaid 
expansion’s economic impact could reasonably lead one to believe this 
aspect is determinative in a coercion analysis. But finding coercion based 
solely on economic factors is sure to lead to Justice Cardozo’s “endless 
difficulties,” as economic analyses have few clear guidelines.127
123. See id. at 2604. Justice Ginsburg likewise concluded that Dole only considered the coercion 
argument after finding that the conditions were unrelated to the highway program and not a restriction 
on how funds were to be used. Id. at 2634.
124. See id. at 2604; see also Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 50-60 (examining if and how Chief Justice 
Roberts and the Joint Dissent applied the Dole test).
125. See NFIB, 132 U.S. at 2604.
126. See generally Edwin Chemerinsky, Protecting The Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 90-
97 (2001) (discussing why Congress should continue to enjoy broad spending powers).
127. Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 589-90.
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Chief Justice Roberts listed a number of statistics showing the eco-
nomic impact that Medicaid has on states: Medicaid accounts for 20 per-
cent of an average states total budget, with federal funds covering 50% to 
83% percent of those costs; the federal government will pay out approxi-
mately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 simply to cover pre-expansion 
Medicaid; and States have intricate statutory and administrative regimes for 
Pre-existing Medicaid.128 Chief Justice Roberts contrasted this data with 
Dole: Whereas all South Dakota stood to lose was less than half of one 
percent of its budget, an average state rejecting the Medicaid expansion 
stood to lose over ten percent of its budget.129 The Joint Dissent made a 
very similar argument: Medicaid is by far the largest federal grant to states 
and state expenditure program.130 The Joint Dissent noted that it is unreal-
istic for states to raise their own revenue to replace the program, using Ari-
zona as an example, where federal Medicaid grants make up one third of 
that State’s budget.131
Neither of these opinions, however, clearly state just why these fac-
tors, nor if only these factors, are the reason the Medicaid expansion was 
coercive. If coercion is based solely on the economic impact of a program, 
courts will determine whether future conditional spending clause cases are 
closer to Dole’s one half of one percent of state funding or NFIB’s ten per-
cent of an average state’s overall budget, since no current program even 
remotely reaches Medicaid’s cost level. Are courts supposed to take into 
account the distinct economic natures of each state? The grant’s impact on 
each state? The grant’s impact on the nation as a whole, even on states not 
joined in the suit? In addition, how should courts determine whether a pro-
gram is sufficiently “entrenched” in a state?132 The amount of state work-
ers working in the program? The number of residents participating? The 
impact the program has on other state institutions? Such questions are near-
ly impossible to answer in the abstract, and help explain why both Chief 
Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissenters might have refused to draw a line 
in determining where coercion occurs.
128. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2604 (2012).
129. Id. at 2604-05.
130. See id. at 2663 (joint dissent).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J., majority for Medicaid Expansion).
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3. What is the significance of Chief Justice Roberts’ “Separate Program” 
Analysis?
Chief Justice Robert’s “separate program” analysis is a critical part of 
his opinion. The Chief Justice declares that the Medicaid expansion is an 
entirely separate program from “traditional” Medicaid due to the many 
differences in coverage and funding in the expansion itself.133 What is the 
relevance of this portion of the opinion? Professor Samuel Bagenstos 
makes a persuasive case for using the “separate program” analysis to find 
coercion, which he labels the “anti-leveraging principle”: Congress cannot 
take a large, entrenched federal program that provides large amounts of 
funds to the states, and tell states that their continued participation is de-
pendent on participation on a separate, independent program.134 Under this 
analysis, when the Medicaid expansion became a separate and independent 
program from pre-existing Medicaid, Congress acted coercively by forcing 
states to implement this new program, or risk losing all funding for a sepa-
rate, independent program.135 This analysis seems to come close to how 
Chief Justice Roberts operated in NFIB. Upon finding the Medicaid expan-
sion to be a new program, he held that it was coercive to leverage funding 
for traditional Medicaid upon implementing the new program.
Professor Bagenstos’ “anti-leveraging principle” is a very persuasive 
method. However, it is not clear from the Chief Justice’s opinion that coer-
cion necessarily boils down to whether Congress has threatened funding for 
a separate program in order to coerce states into implementing a new pro-
gram. If this were the case, why would the Chief Justice go into detail 
about what states could have foreseen when they entered into the Medicaid 
program? Why elaborate that conditional spending grant programs, like 
Medicaid, are viewed in the nature of a contract? If the Medicaid expansion 
was an entirely separate program from traditional Medicaid, it was irrele-
vant whether states could have foreseen Medicaid changing in such a dra-
matic manner. The coercion lies in leveraging funds for one program while 
implementing a separate program, not in states catching by surprise. While 
the anti-leveraging principle provides a clear coercion test, it does not an-
swer why the separate program analysis was made in the first place.
Professor James Blumstein’s “clear notice” analysis, on the other 
hand, provides a convincing answer as to why the “separate program” 
analysis mattered.136 Professor Blumstein writes that Chief Justice Roberts, 
133. Id. at 2605.
134. See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 864-65.
135. See id. at 864-73.
136. See Blumstein, supra note 8, at 93.
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in line with his contractual analysis, found that the federal government 
failed to put the states on clear notice of the nature, scope, and magnitude 
of their obligations when they originally signed up for the Medicaid pro-
gram.137 The contractual requirement of clear notice safeguards states 
against enforcing new terms and conditions when states could not antici-
pate them at contract formation.138 Chief Justice Roberts’ “separate pro-
gram” finding was the remedy for this solution. As “clear notice” in 
contract formation suggests that states should be bound only by obligations 
they could have foreseen at the outset, the Medicaid expansion would be 
considered a new program given its dramatic differences from traditional 
Medicaid.139
Professor Blumstein’s clear notice analysis properly recognizes that 
the Chief Justice’s “separate program” analysis was part of a broader “con-
tract” analysis. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that even though Congress has 
always reserved the right to alter, amend, or repeal the Medicaid statute, 
Congress did not have the power to surprise states with unforeseeable con-
ditions.140 The Medicaid expansion exceed Congress’ power to legislate 
under the spending power by “surprising participating States with post-
acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions . . . [a] State could hardly anticipate 
that Congress’s reservation of the right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid 
program included the power to transform it so dramatically.”141
B. Main Policies of the NFIB Majority
Justice Cardozo was correct in holding that “endless difficulties” 
would arise in a purely economic impact analysis. But by looking beyond 
the opinion’s face, and into the opinion’s policies, we can dig out of these 
difficulties.
First, neither the Chief Justice nor the Joint Dissent directly stated that 
the economic impact alone is the reason the Medicaid expansion was coer-
cive. The economic factors were certainly important—referring to the ex-
pansion as a “gun to the head”142 and “unlike anything we have ever 
seen”143 make that clear. But both opinions emphasize that the expansion is 
not simply coercive merely because it was economically burdensome.
137. See id. at 94-99.
138. Id. at 98-99.
139. See id.
140. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2605-06 (2012).
141. Id. at 2606 (citation omitted).
142. Id. at 2604.
143. Id. at 2664.
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Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion placed special importance on viewing 
the Medicaid expansion in the nature of a contract. Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal 
moneys, it must do so unambiguously.”144 States could not have foreseen 
Medicaid being transformed into a “universal health insurance cover-
age”145 program in 1965. Congress understood it was transforming the 
program by creating a new funding mechanism, coverage population, and 
level of coverage through the expansion.146 Congress, the Chief Justice 
wrote, cannot surprise states 50 years into an agreement with such a dra-
matic change.147 This unilateral and dramatic change in the contract, then, 
seems to be more important to the Chief Justice’s opinion than purely eco-
nomic factors. After all, the Chief Justice explained that Medicaid is al-
ready a tremendous burden on state budgets, and previous expansions com-
compounded this burden. But the Chief Justice differentiated the Medicaid 
expansion from previous expansions not because it placed a greater eco-
nomic burden on states, but because this particular Medicaid expansion 
changed the program in a way previous expansions did not.
The Joint Dissent placed special importance on the power of the fed-
eral government.148 The Joint Dissent rejected the federal government’s 
argument that coercion cannot exist if a State is free as a matter of law to 
reject the expansion, as such a holding would allow the federal government 
to exploit political realities of states and use its superior economic strength 
to take over traditional state activities via conditional spending grants.149
The Joint Dissenters discuss the Medicaid program’s structure, which they 
concluded Congress designed knowing that no state could realistically opt 
out.150 The Joint Dissent found that the expansion’s goal was universal 
coverage, and Congress’ failure to provide a “back-up plan” indicated that 
they did not believe States had a realistic option but to accept the expan-
sion.151 This “structural” analysis seems more important to the Joint Dis-
senters than the economic analysis. In other words, the issue is not so much 
that the Medicaid expansion put more of an already outstanding burden on 
states; rather, the issue is that the states had no choice but to accept this 
burden.
144. Id. at 2605.
145. Id. at 2605-06.
146. See id. at 2606.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 2662 (joint dissent).
149. See id. at 2661-62.
150. See id. at 2664-65.
151. See id. at 2665.
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Taking these policies into consideration, it appears that both the Chief 
Justice and the Joint Dissenters used the coercion argument to “level the 
playing field” between the federal government and states. The Chief Justice 
embraced coercion so that the federal government would no longer have 
the sole ability to surprise states with post-acceptance conditions. The Joint 
Dissenters embraced the coercion argument so that the federal government 
could not leverage its superior economic position to leave states no choice 
but to change their own laws.
C. Proposed Framework: The “Harm” Analysis
Taking into consideration the policies stated above, I propose the fol-
lowing framework, titled the “harm analysis,” for conditional spending 
challenges: If the conditions attached to the program are both directly relat-
ed to the program’s goals, and restrict how the funds are to be used, the 
program is presumptively constitutional under Dole. If the conditions at-
tached do not directly govern the use of the funds offered to a state, the 
challenger must next show that the federal government threatens to “harm” 
the states into compliance, either by showing that Congress has changed 
the program in such a way that was unforeseeable when the state entered 
into the program, or structured the program in such a way where states 
have no choice but to implement it. Finally, if there is harm, then the court 
must ask whether the totality of the circumstances, including the economic 
impact, reaches the point where coercion is present.
1. Dole Analysis
The first requirement of the Harm analysis asks if the conditions at-
tached to funding are a restriction on how the funds are to be used. If con-
ditions on a program are restrictions on how the programs funds are to be 
used, applying the coercion test is not necessary, as the program is pre-
sumptively within Congress’ power to spend according to the general wel-
fare.152 This first prong of the analysis is labeled the “Dole analysis” 
because the Dole court, according to the Chief Justice, did not consider 
whether the highway funding condition was coercive until it found that the 
drinking age did not to govern the use of highway funding.153 The “Dole 
152. See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 869. Professor Bagenstos has also suggested that the Dole test 
be seen as the “trigger” for a coercion analysis; emphasizing that it is met when a program acts to 
terminate other significant independent grants. See id. The “harm” analysis likewise includes a “Dole 
trigger,” but presumes that coercive conditions can exist beyond simply threatening one program to 
pressure states into implementing another. Id.
153. See NFIB, 132 U.S. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J., majority for Medicaid Expansion).
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analysis” therefore does not take into account the full Dole test, though it 
presumes that a conditional spending program will be applied to the Dole
test.
2. Harm Analysis
The next step requires a party to show “harm” by showing that Con-
gress changed the program in such a way that the state could not have fore-
seen when it entered into the program, or structured it in such a way where 
it gives the states no choice but to implement the program. It is likely that 
truly coercive legislation will have both types of harm, though showing 
significant portions of one type of harm alone is likely to satisfy this analy-
sis.
a. Programmatic Harm
The first type of harm asks whether a program has been changed in a 
way that the state could not have reasonably expected. This is in line with 
Chief Justice Roberts’ view of conditional spending grants in the nature of 
a contract.154 To consider whether a program has changed in such a way 
that a state could not have foreseen it when it signed up, a court should, like 
Chief Justice Roberts did in NFIB, take into account objective factors, de-
termining whether the expansion has changed the purpose or goals of the 
program; whether Congress has dramatically expanded the scope of the 
program; whether the states obligations will change; and whether the stat-
ute that Congress first enacted gave adequate notice that an expansion of 
this type will occur.155
b. Structural Harm
The second type of harm exists where Congress structures a program 
in such a way to force states to implement the program and it can apply in 
every coercion challenge. In this analysis, the penultimate question is 
whether Congress has structured the program in such a way as to force 
states choice to implement the program. To find this, courts should analyze 
whether Congress has required states to either change their own laws or 
face a funding cut or tax increase, or whether Congress has included a 
backup option or alternative to prevent a state from being forced to act 
against its will. Though a thorough economic analysis is not proper at this 
stage of the analysis, the court should also consider whether Congress has 
154. See id. at 2602.
155. See id. at 2605-06.
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structured the statute in such a way where the state will lose funding by 
failing to implement the program. This analysis should also take into con-
sideration how “entrenched” a program is in the state, i.e. the impact that 
accepting or rejecting the program would have on citizens and state and 
private agencies.156 While conditions are likely to change with most every 
conditional spending program at one point or another, and oftentimes in 
ways states likely could not have foreseen at the outset, this “surprise” is 
almost certainly not coercive if it affects, say, a relatively insignificant 
grant program, as compared to a significant portion of that state’s citizens 
and budget as in Medicaid.
3. Totality of the Circumstances
Finally, once harm is shown, the court must determine whether the to-
tality of the circumstances, including the economic impact of the program, 
constitutes coercion. I propose that the economic analysis act as a way for 
the federal government to rebut the presumption of coercion. Should a state 
show that Dole is inapplicable and that harm existed, then a program is 
presumptively coercive. But the federal government can argue that the 
economic impact is slight enough to where the state ultimately retained its 
decision-making ability. “Economic impact” should be analyzed from mul-
tiple angles: The total dollar loss a state faces, the percentage of a state’s 
budget lost; the ability for a state to replace the program or handle its loss; 
the impact of the program on the state’s citizens, institutions, and economy; 
the size of a program, and any other financial impact the program might 
have.
The facts of Dole provide for a good hypothetical of this part of the 
analysis. The drinking age condition acted as a way for the federal govern-
ment to pressure states into changing their laws, not as a restriction on how 
states were to spend highway funding.157 And the statute removed this 
funding from any state that had yet to set their drinking age to 21, leaving 
the state with no options besides changing their laws or facing a penalty. 
Thus it was thus structured in a way to leave a state no real choice but to 
implement the program.158 At this point of the analysis, the statute in Dole
was presumably coercive, but the federal government was able to rebut this 
presumption by showing the extremely slight economic impact, namely 
less than five percent of the state’s highway funding.159
156. See id. at 2604.
157. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1987).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 210-11.
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4. Defending the harm analysis
A brief explanation of why the harm analysis is structured in this 
manner is in order. The consistency and legitimacy of future coercion cases 
will almost certainly be increased if rested, at least in part, on showing 
objective harm done to states in the way Congress structured or changed 
the program. Courts would no longer have to begin and end their analysis 
on whether the economic impact of a program is coercive, relying on the 
paltry language in NFIB. Instead, the analysis will focus on substantive 
issues such as the language of the statute, the details of the federal-state 
relationship, how the program impacts federal and state governments, and 
what the expectations of the states were when they signed up for the pro-
gram. While these concepts are hardly simple, they are less subjective than 
the economic analyses of Dole or NFIB.
Beginning with the Dole analysis allows for courts to make an initial 
determination of whether the challenged statute is clearly within Congress’ 
spending power. If conditions attached to a grant are a restriction on how 
they are to be used, then the grant should be analyzed under the Dole con-
ditional spending test, not coercion. Thus, a condition that simply revokes 
funding for not enacting policy changes—e.g. the highway funding in Dole
or the ability to revoke Medicaid funding in NFIB—would fail this Dole
analysis.
The two “harm” analyses, “programmatic” and “structural,” recognize 
the two main concerns that the Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters had in 
NFIB. The programmatic harm analysis draws largely from the Chief Jus-
tice’s opinion, and the structural analysis largely from the Joint Dissent. 
There has been some discussion as to whether the Chief Justice’s opinion 
and the Joint Dissent’s opinion are actually two separate analyses, and if 
so, whether coercion cases will play out differently under each analysis.160
It is true that the Chief Justice focused more on notice, whereas the Joint 
Dissent focused more on the design of the statute. But these analyses large-
ly compliment and overlap one another. For example, a program will al-
most certainly not be coercive if Congress has surprised the state with 
dramatically different conditions, but the state is free to back out of the 
program without incurring any loss. Likewise, a program is almost certain-
ly not coercive if Congress has structured the program’s conditions in a 
manner where a state has little choice but to implement the new program, 
but the changes were reasonably foreseeable or expected when the state 
160. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 75, at 595 (finding that the Chief Justice focused on separate 
programs, notice, and economic dragooning to see whether coercion existed; whereas the Joint Dis-
sent’s coercion analyses focused nearly entirely on “economic dragooning”).
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entered into the program. Coercion thus will likely arise only where there 
has been both programmatic and structural harm. Nor does a state neces-
sarily have to suffer a significant level of both programmatic and structural 
harm. Arguably, the Medicaid expansion’s structure—threatening to revoke 
all of a states Medicaid funding— was far more coercive to the states than 
the unexpected new conditions were.
Analyzing the economic impact of a program is a necessarily evil. Part 
IV discussed the inherent difficulty and arbitrary nature of the economic 
analysis. Despite these serious flaws, not including an economic analysis 
would result in a flawed coercion framework. First, Dole’s coercion analy-
sis focused solely on the economic impact,161 and both Chief Justice Rob-
erts and the Joint Dissenters placed tremendous emphasis on it.162 Ignoring 
the two main coercion opinions is not good policy. Second, it is hard to 
imagine any situation where a state had no choice but to implement a pro-
grammatic expansion because, and only because, it could not have foreseen 
the expansion or Congress designed the expansion to be difficult to turn 
down. States, being sovereigns, are free to reject the programs. But if there 
is a substantial economic impact, this dramatically increases the likelihood 
that states had their hands tied.
Finally, the “harm” analysis intentionally does not ask the court to 
consider any “separate program” analysis. Some commentators have identi-
fied the “separate program” factor as the key to future coercion analyses.163
For example, Professor Eloise Pascahoff has developed a coercion analysis 
that first focuses on whether funding for a significant, independent grant is 
threatened.164
Alternatively, the harm analysis is premised on the idea that legisla-
tion can be coercive even if it does not terminate an independent grant. The 
harm analysis does not ignore the fact that terminating significant inde-
pendent grants is coercive; in fact, any program that does so would be co-
ercive under the harm analysis. But based on the policies and themes of the 
NFIB opinions, coercion can apply where there is lack of notice or structur-
al harm, regardless of whether independent grants are at stake. Indeed, the 
Joint Dissent’s hypothetical of levying a heavy tax on states to pay for a 
secondary education program is an instance where no independent grants 
are terminated, but coercion arguably exists.165
161. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
162. See NFIB, 132 U.S. at 2604, 2663.
163. See Bagenstos, supra note 8.
164. See Pasachoff, supra note 75, at 594.
165. See NFIB, 132 U.S. at 2662 (joint dissent).
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V. HARM ANALYSIS IN ACTION: THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The Clean Air Act has been mentioned as a likely target for a coercion 
argument due to the structure of the program.166 In fact, it already has been 
the target of a coercion challenge. Texas, along with other states, chal-
lenged the EPA’s ability to require states to regulate greenhouse gases from 
motor vehicles, or face sanctions.167 After NFIB was decided, Texas filed a 
notice of supplemental authority, arguing that the EPA’s ability to take 
away funding or impose a construction ban on areas noncompliant with 
new regulations is coercive.168 The D.C. Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, holding that the Clean Air Act’s conditions were “not at all 
comparable” to the “magnitude” of the Medicaid expansion.169 While 
Clean Air Act’s provisions have already been held non-coercive, Texas 
may well still appeal this case to the Supreme Court. In any event, the 
Clean Air Act is a good case study to analyze the harm analysis, given how 
its conditions act in a somewhat similar fashion to the Medicaid expansion.
A. The Clean Air Act
The current Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970, creating a state-
federal program to combat pollution.170 The Clean Air Act operates, in 
part, by the EPA promulgating minimum pollution standards, after which 
states create “state implementation plans” (or SIPS) that meet these stand-
ards.171 In return, the states receive grants from the EPA paying up to sixty 
percent of the state’s costs for their pollution control programs.172 The EPA 
Administrator has discretion, should a state fail to submit a plan that meets 
EPA guidelines, to effectively prohibit highway funding in the state or 
prevent construction of any building that requires a pollution permit.173 If 
however, a state has an EPA-designated “non-attainment” area where pol-
lution is deemed especially troublesome, the sanctions become mandatory 
166. See Brad Plumer, How the Supreme Court’s Health Care Ruling Could Weaken The Clean Air 
Act, WONKBLOG, (July 27, 2012, 1:36 PM), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012
/07/27/how-the-supreme-courts-health-care-ruling-could-weaken-the-clean-air-act/; see also Jonathan 
Adler, Could the Health Care Decision Hobble the Clean Air Act?, THE PERCOLATOR,
http://perc.org/blog/could-health-care-decision-hobble-clean-air-act (last visited June 6, 2013).
167. See Brief for Petitioners, Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1037), 2013 
WL 3836226.
168. See Hurley, supra note 10.
169. Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
170. History of the Clean Air Act, EPA.GOV, www.epa.gov/oar/caa/caa_history.html (last updated 
February, 17, 2012).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 7405 (2012).
173. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7509 (2012).
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for that particular non-attainment area.174 These sanctions are not perma-
nent—the EPA can effectively take over pollution control in the state or 
non-compliant area by implementing a “federal implementation plan,” and 
must do so within two years of noncompliance.175
Unlike Medicaid noncompliance, sanctions for C.A.A. noncompliance 
are frequent. From 1990 to 1997, the EPA imposed sanctions on fourteen 
occasions.176 When the EPA determines a state is noncompliant, it must 
give that state a reasonable deadline in order to submit a plan.177 Such was 
the case when the EPA, having recently received Supreme Court approval 
to regulate greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehicles,178 promulgated 
new greenhouse gas guidelines that state SIPs must follow.179 When sever-
al states failed to meet these guidelines, they were given three months to 
act before the EPA would implement its own federal implementation plan 
in the state.180
B. Harm Analysis In Action
I will apply the “harm” analysis to a simple yet still plausible Clean 
Air Act challenge: A state challenging the constitutionality of the Clean Air 
Act after facing EPA sanctions by failing to revise its SIP to comply with 
sweeping new EPA guidelines.
1. Dole Analysis
The first part of the Harm analysis asks whether the conditions are di-
rectly related to the purposes of the Clean Air Act, and whether the condi-
tions place a restriction on how the funds are to be used. Threatening to 
revoke federal highway funding for program noncompliance appears, on its 
face, to be the exact same condition as Dole. The Clean Air Act may be 
even more coercive than Dole. As Jonathan Adler points out, the Clean Air 
Act’s sanctions can revoke far more than just five percent of highway fund-
ing.181 However, the Dole analysis first requires us to see if the conditions 
may be related to the program’s goals, and not simply to compare the pro-
gram to Dole’s highway funding. The Clean Air Act’s stated purpose is “to 
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509.
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
176. See McCarthy, supra note 11, at 3-4.
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
178. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
179. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 167.
180. See id.
181. See Adler, supra note 166.
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protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to pro-
mote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its popu-
lation”182 A ban on highway construction may seem only tangentially 
related to accomplishing this goal. But the Clean Air Act’s conditions are 
more specific than Dole’s bare funding reduction; non-compliant states 
may still spend highway funding on highway programs designed to im-
prove safety or environmental standards.183 In addition, as David Baake
points out, the sanctions will generally only target certain non-attainment 
areas within a state, unlike Dole, where Congress targeted South Dakota as 
a whole for cuts to highway spending.184 The highway funding condition 
under the Clean Air Act is therefore much closer to restricting funds for the 
purposes of the Clean Air Act, and further from simply being a policy tool 
to force states to make policy changes. On the other hand, Jonathan Adler 
points out that highway funding is a separate program entirely from the 
Clean Air Act, with Congress threatening the receipt of grants for one pro-
gram on implementation of another program, not unlike conditioning tradi-
tional Medicaid funding on implementing the Medicaid expansion in 
NFIB.185
If a court were to apply an “anti-leveraging” analysis to a Clean Air 
Act coercion challenge, Adler’s concern would play a very significant role. 
In the harm analysis, however, the fact that the Clean Air Act’s sanctions 
affect funding for an independent program is largely something to take into 
consideration in determining whether the conditions are a restriction on 
how funds are to be used. The fact that the Clean Air Act’s sanctions affect 
funding for an independent program goes towards the Clean Air Act failing 
the Dole analysis. However, given that the Clean Air Act’s highway fund-
ing condition is much closer to achieving program goals than the bare fund-
ing reductions in Dole or NFIB, it is possible to make the argument that the 
conditions are simply a restriction on how funds are to be spent, meaning 
the Clean Air Act would not even reach prongs two and three of the harm 
analysis.
2. Harm Analysis
For the sake of argument, assume that the Clean Air Act’s sanctions 
fail the Dole analysis. The Harm analysis, then, asks whether the states 
182. 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509.
184. See David Baake, Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No Highway”
Provision Constitutional After NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4-5 (2012).
185. See Adler, supra note 166.
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could have foreseen the change in the program when they agreed to imple-
ment it, or alternatively, has Congress has styled the program in such a way 
that a state has no choice but to implement it.
The Clean Air Act has had a very different history than Medicaid. 
Whereas the states’ Medicaid obligations have been repeatedly expanded 
by statute,186 the Clean Air Act has only seen major statutory changes 
twice since its enactment.187 The Environmental Protection Agency instead 
frequently changes the states’ responsibilities under the Clean Air Act 
through new administrative guidelines and orders, some of which can be 
significant, such as when greenhouse gases from motor vehicles were re-
quired to be regulated for the first time in 2007.188
But this is not necessarily a violation of the Chief Justice Roberts’ 
“contract” theory of conditional spending grants. States were aware when 
they signed up for the “contract” that the EPA would frequently issue new 
standards, and that the states would have to adjust their SIPS according-
ly.189 The EPA’s new greenhouse gas requirements did not dramatically 
change what the program covered or how it would be operated, and was the 
latest in a long line of new pollution standards, which are expected to 
change. In contrast, the Medicaid expansion dramatically changed the cov-
erage population and funding mechanism in a way that was not expected in 
1965.190 Put another way, states had “clear notice” that greenhouse gases 
from motor vehicles were a pollutant in 1970, and theoretically within 
reach of the Clean Air Act’s regulations; states did not have “clear notice” 
that Medicaid would expand beyond certain classes of “deserving poor” in 
1965.191
The Clean Air Act also does not appear to be the same sort of “struc-
tural” harm that the Joint Dissenters saw in the Medicaid expansion. Most 
significantly, the Clean Air Act has a backup plan: states can simply choose 
not to act, and petition the federal government to implement a federal im-
plementation plan within the state.192 This backup plan gives states an al-
ternative between implementation and harm, something that the Joint 
Dissenters placed tremendous emphasis on.193 There are other structural 
mechanisms in place that make the Clean Air Act less coercive than the 
186. See Huberfeld, supra note 5, at 21-23.
187. See History of the Clean Air Act, supra note 170.
188. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
190. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2606 (2012).
191. See Blumstein, supra note 8, at 96-98.
192. See Baake, supra note 184, at 6-7.
193. See NFIB, 132 U.S. at 2665 (joint dissent).
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Medicaid program. For example, the EPA, as a rule, must “take over” con-
trol from the state via a federal implementation plan whenever a state peti-
tions the EPA to do so, which relieves a state of Clean Air Act sanctions.194
However, the Clean Air Act is much closer to being “structurally” 
harmful towards states with non-attainment areas. Whereas the EPA Ad-
ministrator does not have to sanction a typical state, sanctions are mandato-
ry for non-attainment areas.195 While the EPA is required to promulgate a 
FIP within two years of non-compliance,196 that is still two years that a 
state may have to live with a significant loss of highway funding. A state 
could rightfully fear for a lack of real choice between enacting new guide-
lines against its will or two years of harmful sanctions. Even though there 
remains a “backup plan,” states still face tremendous pressure to enact a 
compliant SIP up front rather than face uncertain sanctions. This may well 
be an example of the federal government using its leverage on a state to get 
it to implement policies against its will.
3. Totality of the Circumstances
Assuming again that the court finds that Congress has structured the 
Clean Air Act in a way that harms states, we finally look to the totality of 
the circumstances to see if states are truly coerced into compliance with the 
Clean Air Act. As explained earlier, there is no easy way to do this, and it 
involves a variety of factors. A good starting spot is determining what 
funds are at stake. In 2010, the national appropriation to states for highway 
funding that would be affected by Clean Air Act sanctions was $33 bil-
lion.197 However, if sanctions are placed in a non-attainment area, those 
sanctions apply only to the non-attainment area; i.e., a state would still be 
free to continue its highway program outside the area.198 In addition, the 
sanctions are, by design, limited in duration. The sanctions cannot go into 
effect until eighteen months after the EPA determines a SIP is in noncom-
pliance. And the EPA is required to promulgate a FIP within 24 months of 
noncompliance.199 By design, a state would not have to create an entirely 
new program or take full responsibility for its existing pollution programs, 
because the EPA would take them over. Taking these factors into account 
with the “harm” analysis, does the Clean Air Act rise to the level where a 
194. See Baake, supra note 184, at 6-7.
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2012).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
197. Total highway funding appropriation in 2010 was $62 billion, of which all but $33 billion 
would not be affected by a Clean Air Act Sanction. See Baake, supra note 184, at 8.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
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state truly is coerced into accepting its conditions? The funding at stake is 
far less than the twenty percent of an average state’s budget at stake in the 
Medicaid expansion,200 but more than the five percent of South Dakota’s 
federal highway funding in Dole.201 Unlike in NFIB or Dole, the effect is 
substantially limited both in a geographical and temporal sense—sanctions 
are limited to one area, for at most six months, until a federal implementa-
tion plan is put into place.202 Like in Dole, and unlike in NFIB, the effect 
on the state’s citizens and programs would be limited, as the federal gov-
ernment would take over responsibility. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that this relatively limited impact made the Clean Air Act 
incomparable to the Medicaid expansion.203 Thus, even if the Clean Air 
Act’s conditions are meant mostly to pressure states, and even if the Clean 
Air Act is structured in a way to get states to comply, states ultimately re-
tain the final decision-making authority, given the relatively meager impact 
that noncompliance would have.
CONCLUSION
NFIB has created to two separate Medicaid systems in this country. As 
of this writing, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have an-
nounced their intentions to implement the Medicaid expansion, while thir-
teen states have announced plans to reject the expansion.204 This outcome 
was not the intent of Congress in passing the PPACA and will almost cer-
tainly lead to numerous unintended consequences that will require further 
congressional action.205 The revival of the coercion argument itself could, 
likewise, lead to unintended consequences if applied arbitrarily or in an 
inconsistent manner. If coercion remains a mystery wrapped up in an 
enigma, then it will ironically have a negative impact on federalism princi-
ples. Congress will no longer know how to properly promulgate or expand 
a program. States, if they decide they would rather not implement a politi-
cally popular program, could avoid citizen anger by arguing “coercion” in 
the courts regardless of how coercive the measure truly is. Citizens would 
200. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 U.S. 2566, 2604-05 (2012).
201. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
203. Texas v. EPA, No. 10-1425, 2013 WL 3836226 at *15 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2013).
204. Where Each State Stands On ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, ADVISORY.COM (June 14, 2013), 
www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/11/09/MedicaidMap (last visited July 25, 2013).
205. One example of such a consequence is the possibility of a ‘coverage gap’ for citizens in a non-
expanding state, who make too much money to qualify for traditional Medicaid but not enough to 
qualify for federal subsidies through the Health Exchange program of the PPACA; see Jennifer Lubell, 
Rejecting Medicaid Expansion Adds New Dimension To Poverty Line, AMERICAN MED. NEWS (January 
14, 2013), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2013/01/14/gvl20114.htm.
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not know where reward or blame lies. Perhaps most importantly, the citi-
zens who benefit or suffer due to these conditional-spending programs 
would see their lives thrown into limbo based on flimsy doctrine.
Because all Americans have at least some stake in conditional spend-
ing programs, all Americans have a stake in developing a consistent, cor-
rect coercion reading in the post-NFIB challenges. Requiring an initial Dole
analysis recognizes Congress’ broad power under the Spending Clause, 
incorporates Chief Justice Roberts’ analysis of whether the conditions re-
stricted the use of the funding in line with the general welfare, and keeps 
decades of Supreme Court precedent intact. Requiring “harm,” in the form 
of a breach of contract or structural takeover as the next step in the coer-
cion analysis takes into account the policies underlying the NFIB opinion. 
Finally, looking to the totality of the circumstances, only if both Dole is
inapplicable and harm is shown are the courts allowed to analyze more 
concrete arguments, ensuring the rudderless economic analysis does not 
become the sole basis for a holding. Incorporating Supreme Court prece-
dent and policy into the NFIB analysis, and applying it in a manner that 
reduces the possibility for arbitrary decision-making, is a sound, pragmatic 
way to approach the coercion argument without wading into endless diffi-
culties.
